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SoME ASPECTS OP THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
f) (
{^,|92t FROM THE LOWER ANIMALS TO JalT.
wo"
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The object of the thesis,
B. The method used in the development of the thesis.
II. MEMORY AND IMAGINATION
A. Memory in the animal world below man/^'
1. Found in varying degrees.
a. Memory in some degree "basic to life
of all organisms. 3^
(1) Satisfiers and annoyers remembered
as such.
(2) Illustrations: Amoeba, Paramecium,
sea- anemone, ants.
b. Memory accomplishments differ in different
(3 - S)
species
.
c. Memory accomplishments differ in like
C*
-
1)
species.
(1) Illustrations: Mayflies, Individual
animals in groups of trained rep-
tiles, birds, mammals.
2. Physiological and Psychical evolution complement-
ary; the evolutionary process being as marked in
one field as in the other.
3. The evolution of the memory factor marking
the change from the organic to the associative
type of memory.

4. Factual knowledge is not transmissible
in any great degree.
a. Memory of satisfiers and annoyers not
Qar- 10
transferrred by heredity.
b. No language, or other such ability, for
transference of knowledge gained and re-
(,(p - I &)
membered.
(1) Many inhibitions taught through
example, coaxing, punishment; but
lacking in degree to what might be
taught if language were usable.
B. Memory m Man
(iff - xj)
1. Sensori-motor memory.
a. This type of memory found in human ex-
perience
.
b. All animals including man derive benefit
(is-)
from sensori-motor factor.
0*)
c. This distinctly an organic type of memory.
d. Sensori-motor memory, expressed in habit,
a strong influence in making present day
Of -human life possible.
2. Memory involving images.
a. The image.
(1) Experiences re-experienced without
(£/)presence of object itself.
(2) Images of sound, pressure, sight,
color, of any or all sensuous experience
b. The image of past experiences.
(a* >
(1) Image not always used, but used at
will, in remembering past experiences.

(2) Satisfiers and annoyers remembered
as such, and remembrance, in part,
Of)
governs life.
/ai- 33)
Imagination in the animal world, e
1. Imagination, which is memory involving images,
marks its possessor for a high place in the
evolutionary scheme.
a. First appearance of imagination In lower
forms of animal life extremely problematical,
b. In higher animals, those reveal'ing associative
memory, imagination plays its part. ^
c. In man the imaginative power highly de-
veloped.
2. Mental images as "Plights of Fancy."
a. Many of these most intangible and ./ell
named day- drearns.
b. Boy, In day-dream, sees himself as a
dashing cavalier or a roaming pirate. ^
c. G-irl v/aiting for and seeing the coming
of a knight.
d. Day-dreams all normal people dream. M
e. Judged by pragmatic standards these dreams
are factual. ~ ^1
3. Images, visions, of and for the future.
a. The "Forward Look".
(1) Utilizing the advantages of memory
images, man looks into the future

and plans accordingly; Kepner well calls
man the most prescient of animals.
(2) Man alone makes intellectual prepara-
tion for the future.
(a) Question of dog burying bone,
squirrel burying nuts, ants
(xq)
storing food. 1
7
.
(b) In protozoan there can be no
"Forward Look" for the organism
has no neurological system.
(c) In higher animals below man what
appears to be "Forward Look" ex-
plainea on instinctive level.
"Forward Look" postive rather than
negative in effect.
(1) In "'Flights of Fancy" man may be
in a state of lethargy, storing
(3/
J
nervous energy.
(2) In "Forward Look" the mind is at
work burning energy. ^
(3) A creative imagination Is here at
work. (^ 33)
Undoubtedly we are here on a high level
of evolutionary development; the physiologi-
cal is not in the discard, but it is, by
the psychical, relegated to a secondary
C-)place.

III. CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE
A. Conceptual Thought in the animal world. (3J " i3)
1. Conceptual Thought defined.
a. The power of abstraction, generalization,
reasoning. **^}
b. Ability to break up preceptions, seeing re-
lationships between component parts. y
c. Involves analysis of situations and sep-
aration of elements from combinations afore-
time experienced.
2. Ideation as a functioning ability.
a. In the concept Intellectuality is made
possible. ^ ^
b. In the concept education, science, business,
and professional activities have their basis.
c. Man related to and part of animal world
but through power of ideation becomes self-
builded and a world builder. (3 %
d. Theoretically, at least, the Brahman reveals
the animal-man ruled by the man of thought.
3. The Idealizing tendency g the highest expression
of the intellectual life.
a. McDougall and social consciousness.

b« Galloway and the Ought- Consciousness
(1) Illustrations: Ignorant servant
Lancelot Bobbo, the fighter con-
sciously fighting a losing "battle,
Francis of Asissi, religious
martyrs of all ages,
c. Fite in the idealizing tendency sees ~*3)
the individual lose his personality
in the life of the social group.
(1) Illustrations: artist musician,
Lincoln.
Language in the Animal /orId. & 3 ~ s3 )
1. Among Sentinel and Social Animals.
a. Theory that animals talk has many supporters
b. Many an animal lover knows a creature that
"talks". ^
c. Actions of so called "talking" animals ex-
plained on sensori-motor level.
(1) Bees, ants, deer, geese, need no
language.
d. Cries and calls of birds and mammals, hens,
cats, dogs, are made on the sensori-
motor level.
2. Among so-called "Talking" birds.
a« No "talking" birds found in native haunts;
always found in, or having been, in human
environment. U V

b. Birds employ arts of mimicry, there being
no analysis of words in respect to
meaning. ( " 7
3. Among Men.
a. Language concomitant in closest sense
with conceptual thought. v
(1) Ward sees origin of thought as a
permanent activity to acquisition.
(2) G-alloway sees language possession only
of man.
b. Words, peculiar sounds, have particular
meanings, representing things and simple
ideas. 0*0
c. :ords linked together represent ideas of
any degree of complexity.
4. Words are communicable.
a. Here is the secret of intellectuality ^
b. Child, one and a half years old, forms
sentence to express an idea, a desire.
c. Language not simply vocalization but the
expression of ideas. ( s^
IV. CONCLUSION
A. Resume of object of Thesis.
1. To show the trend of mind development in the
evolutionary process.
B. Correlation of Factors named.
1. The memory factor, of organic type is present
in lowest organisms.

The associative memory coupled, with organic
( s-s-)
memory marks an upward trend.
Memory accomplishments differ in different
species, and a distinct broadening of the life
Is* )is seen with greater memory ability.
Memory in man is seen as organic and associative,
ooth playing a part.
The image and play of imagination noted in the
onward movement among higher animals including man.
In Man the "Forward Look", the creative imagina-
tion, functions. (s
~ 7)
Conceptual Thought, in man, making intellectuality
possible. (s-s)
Language expressing and communicating that
Thought, placing man at the apex of the
evolutionary pyramid. ( SS' S V

SOME ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
FROM THE LOWER ANIMALS TO MAN.
INTRODUCTION
The object of the thesis is to show the trend of mind
development in the evolutionary process. The thesis does
not attempt to cover the whole field of the evolution of-
consciousness, or even to trace the main phases of mental
development, either among the lower animals or in man, or the
two in conjunction; taut rather stresses a few phases of the
life of organisms, and marks certain abilities, or lack of
them which show a distinct trend and development. With this
object in mind, we consider the problem of Mrmory and
Imagination as they appear, or fail to appear, in the animal
world, and Conceptual Thought and Language as found only
in the higher animals.
The method used in the development of the thesis is a
consideration and evaluation of the data given by author-
ities in the field of animal and genetic psychology, with
the use of a little experimental knowledge, derived through
a consideration of the above data, in work v/ith some of
the lower animals.

1.
SOME ASPECTS OF THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS
FROM THE' LOTCER ANIMALS TO MAN.
"Tien we make a study of the evolution of consciousness
we are confronted with, four outstanding phases of mind de-
velopment: memory and imagination which are closely allied,
and conceptual thought and langtiage which in a like way are
related.
Memory in one degree or another is basic to the life
of all organisms except the very lov/est, and traces of some-
thing akin to memory are to be found in these. Satisfiers
and annoyers, stimuli which give a note of satisfaction or
annoyance, are remembered as such. This fact is clearly
illustrated by " rashburn^. Here we have the story of pur-
suit, capture and ingestion of one amoeba by another; es-
cape of captured amoeba, its recapture and its final escape.
"One who sees the behavior of pursuer, as it occurs, can
hardly resist the conviction that the action at this point,
reversal of movement for the sake of pursuit, is partly
determined by the change due to former possession." From
this statement the conclusion may well be drawn that a
feeling of remembrance was present even in this one-celled
p
organism. Washburn also tells of a Paramecium that learns
to avoid specks of carmine, and even more quickly to dis-
criminate between particles of aluminum. By making tests
at different times, and finding that the negative reaction
comes more quickly in the later tests, the conclusion is
1 The Animal Mind p. 49
2 Ibid p. 68

2.
drawn that the protozoan remembers previous experiences.
Quoting from some manuscripts of Darwin's, Romanes"*" writes:
"Even the headless oyster seems to profit from experience, and
may be trained to keep its shell closed." Oysters taken
directly from deep water and carried long distances over
land, open their shells, lose the water contained, and quick-
ly spoil. On the other hand, those rnollusks that had period-
ically been exposed to the open air learned when, and when
not, to keep the shell closed, and might safely be trans-
ported without fear of spoilage. We also learn from the
same author that a razor fish will quickly come to the sur-
face if the hollow into which it has burrowed is sprinkled
with salt; while if it is seized on coming to the surface,
and then allowed to escape, it will not again come out of
o
the burrow, no matter how much salt be applied. A ^stentor^
stimulated with carmine, will bend aside in one direction,
then in another, and then if still annoyed, will change
the movement of its cilia. If these actions fail to re-
move the annoyance it will contract upon its stem and final-
ly swim away. When the stentor re-anchors itself, it has
apparently learned something, for when again stimulated it
at once contracts and swims off. Taking into consideration
the fact that any organism or part of an organism that is,
certain muscles or senses, may be modified by the immediate
environment; for example, if an organism be tested to the
straining point, and does hot fall under the strain, it
will come through that experience with stronger resisting
1 Animal Intelligence pp. 25, 26
2 Hobhouse, Mind in Evolution p. 113

3.
power; or the athlete, using his muscles day by day eventually
finds himself with "bigger and stronger muscles; the change in
both illustrations being physiological ones, coming into exist-
ence through contact with a physical environment; and remember-
ing that in some cases the animal organism might react different-
ly on the occasion of a second test because of fatigue, there
is still seen in the illustrations given of the amoeba, Para-
mecium, and stentor, a kind of retentiveness which brings the
experience of past results to bear upon present action in such
a way as to secure similar results a second time. Memory
here is of a simple kind, purely organic in type; and what is
remembered is not an object to be obtained or rejected, but
the most effective type of reaction to present stimulus.
Moving higher in the scale of animal life, there is no
difficulty in finding illustrations of memory at work.
Lubbock^- and Romanes^ give us numberless stories of how
ants, bees, and wasps remember experiences and make use of
knowledge obtained. Then, too, practically all works on
animal psychology stress the memory factor, particularly
among the higher animals.
It is true, then, as shown by the illustrations given
that memory is basic to the life of A organisms from the low-
est to the highest, and an analysis of the life of all
organisms shows memory functioning.
Memory accomplishments differ in different species, and
this fact is so well known and so generally acknowledged that
1 .-nts, Bees and ./asps pp. 153-181
2 Animal Intelligence Chapt. XI.

4.
-]
,
it may seem useless to repeat it. In 1873 Lobins made some
interesting experiments with a pike, and a like experiment
was later made by Triplett with a perch, illustrating the
memory factor.
In an aquarium, divided into two compartments by a
glass screen, Mobius put a pike in one section and some
minnows in the other. For a considerable time the pike
persisted in rushing at the minnows; in spite of the fact
that each time it did so, it bumped its nose on the glass
screen. In time, however, the fish learned its lesson, re-
frained from rushing at the minnows, and even when the screen
was taken away the minnows swam about the tank in safety,
pOther authors, while telling us that the modifying in-
fluence of experience is at a minimum among fishes, ack-
nowledge that fishes learn. Fishes in an aquarium learn
to come to the surface on the approach of the feeder; the
shark haunts the places found to be good hunting grounds,, and
the stickleback "knows the way." back to its nest, even
after a lapse of several hours. This is memory in simple
form in comparison with that shown by the parrot that
recognizes the difference in the ring of one at the back
door and one at the front, and associates the ring of the
back door bell with the bark of a collie dog in the back
4yard, '"ashburn notes a difference in memory ability be-
tween hydra and mollusks. In the former, the stimuli, to
exert any influence on later reactions, must follow in
quick succession; while in the response of mollusks to
1 The Animal Mind p. 263 3 Animal Intelligence p. 269
2 Mind in Evolution p. 135 4 The Animal Mind p. 257

5.
shadows, the experiences of one day appear to reach over to
the following day. Perhaps the difference in the two does
not appear to be very great, and yet the difference marks
distinct evolutionary progress. The chicks mentioned by
Lloyd Morgan^- peck at first with perfect impartiality any-
thing of suitable size; grain, stones, currants, bits of
paper or wood, their own toes or their neighbor's; anything
that can be pecked, and, if possible, tested in the bill.
The chicks, however, soon learn what is good to eat, for in
two days' time a distinction is made between yolk of egg and
bits of orange skin; between cinnabar larvae, distasteful
caterpillars, and green cabbage-moth caterpillars, hemory,
as evidenced by the actions of the chick, is here of a high
order. An interesting story is told by Romanes 2 of a cobra
that thrust its head through a small aperture and swallowed
a toad. With this encumbrance it could not withdraw itself,
so the toad was disgorged. The toad was not to be left,
however, but was again swallowed and again disgorged. The
snake by this time had learned something for the toad was
seized by one leg, withdrawn from its haven, and swallowed.
How much thinking had been done by the cobra, or how much
the associative process had been at work is perhaps doubt-
ful, but one thing is sure, the cobra had learned a lesson.
I/IcDougall^ raises the question as to how much the lower
animals remember, and to support his assertion that many
of them know localities, and remember objects, and the
places these objects occupy in the landscape, tells how
1 Habit and Instinct pp. 40-42 5 Outlines of Psychology p. 80
2 Animal Intelligence p. 262

o •
/asps under observation, on leaving newly constructed nests, will
fly around for some time before setting off for a distance
just as though orienting the nest in relation to the objects
about; and if this be not the object in view the methods
followed by the wasp appear to be senseless. Further support-
ing his view, he notes that when the landscape was somewhat
changed, as by removal of stones, the wasp had great diffi- •
culty, and sometimes found it impossible, to locate its nest.
The same author also sees a like method of seeking to know
the landscape in the preliminary circling flights of the
homing pigeon, both about its own coop and preparatory to
making a long trip home. It seems to UcDougall and to the
writer that both the wasp and the pigeon remember places
and localize particular spots through the associative process,
thus displaying distinct memory ability.
As one comes in contact with trained animals, the result
of an efficient memory is seen. Many of the mammals show a
power to remember that is often amazing. Cole"*" trained raccoons
to climb on a box for food when one of two differently colored
cards was shown. The raccoons recognized the difference in
colors and remembered just when and when not to climb. In
this and in other tests, the animals displayed such acumen
that the experimenter gives the raccoon, for mentality, a place
almost midway between the monkey and the cat. The most in-
telligent of the animals, other than man, are dogs, elephants
and monkeys, and in these the power of memory is highly de-
veloped. Hobhouse tells us that his
1 The Animal Mind p. 261
2 Mind in Evolution p. 240

7.
dogs after only one experience, waited to be lifted upon
particular ledges during his mountain climbing; and this
is but one of many dog stories, each well substantiated,
that might be given as illustrative of the dog-memory. The
trained elephants of the circus, and the working elephant
of the Eastern Countries, alike show evidence of good
memories, as well as that intelligence which is so largely
based on memory. Romanes 1 relates several cases in which
trained elephants, which had escaped and become wild, on
being captured again remembered . the commands and habits of
domestication. C-p© interesting illustration tells of an
elephant escaping after being in captivity for two years.
After running wild for fifteen years, the elephant was re-
captured and remembered in all details the words of command.
It is not difficult to find illustrations of the memory
factor of the monkey. Thorndike^ taught two Cebus monkeys
confined in a cage to come to the bottom of the cage for
food when he took the food in his right hand, and not to come
when he took it in his left hand. The monkeys apparently
remembered when, and when not, the food in sight would be
given to them. Hobhouse3
,
Romanes4
,
Washburn5
,
K6hler e
,
and many others illustrate the monkey's ability to remember,
an ability of a very high order, which makes the learning
process comparatively easy. Koehler
1
^ tells of the female
"Nueva" who used a stick, at first quite clumsily, but an
hour later used it with considerable aptitude; while on the
third trial the stick was used immediately, and efficiently.
1 Animal intelligence p. 386 4 Animal Intelligence Chapt. XVII
2 The Animal Mind p. 261 5 The Animal Mind pp. 229, 296
3 Mind in Evolution Chapt. XII 6 The Mentality of Apes
7 Ibid pp. 23/26

"Koko" , who had "been given some instruction in the use of a
stick, used, all objects as sticks. The stick was remembered
as a tool and then other objects, such as a piece of card-
board, a piece of wire, a thin twig, were used as the stick
had before been used. Sultan, a very clever ape^, first
-pushes the end of one stick into the large hollow end of
another stick, and uses the connected whole to reach the
desired food. Later he readily makes the connection, and
even joins together, into one long rod, three sections. The
memory ability here is seen at work functioning in the fashion-
ing of a new tool. This same ape, on another occasion^, watch-
ed the fruitless efforts of a caged ape, disappeared for a
moment and returned with a stick, suitable for reaching the
food, and this he gave to the caged one. Sultan had apparent-
ly remembered the need of a stick in these circumstances, and
his behavior reveals not only a good memory but also general
intelligence, this, of course largely depending on Memory, of
a very high order
.
This brief resume of memory ability among animals emphasiz
es the fact that memory accomplishments differ in different
species, denoting clear evolutionary development from the
lowest to the highest animals. Memory accomplishments differ
in like species, and while the proving or disproving of the
assertion little affects the argument of the thesis it is,
nevertheless, well that we note the fact. Each experimenter
working under strictest laboratory conditions, like each
animals-lover
,
working with but a few members of a species,
1 The Mentality of Apes pp. 132, 4
2 Ibid p. .116 .
i
9.
notes that invariably a gifted individual stands out from
his fellows. V.ashburn-1-, quoting //odsedalek, tells of train-
ing immature may-flies, especially :, one gifted individual' 7
,
to overcome the tendency to remain under stones in the water.
After two months of training all that was necessary to bring
the specimen up, when it had disappeared from sight, was
to slightly jar the dish in which the may-fly was living
and the insect would quickly come up to the upper side of
the rock and make for its feeding place. ;hat had original-
ly been an annoyer was now remembered as a satisifer; and
the "gifted individual" reaped the benefit therefrom. In
Kindeman's "Lola", in the story of the Elberfeld Horses,
in the work of Thorndike, and others there are always these
"gifted individuals*', as there are "gifted individuals ; in
each group of trained birds, reptiles, or quadrupeds, support-
ing the thesis that in like species mental abilities and
memory accomplishments differ. Physiological and Psychical
evolution are complementary; the evolutionary process being
marked in one field as in the other. In spite of the great
variation in mental ability in members of like species,
these members are sufficiently alike, and these members
differ to such a degree from members of different species,
as to support the above hypothesis. It is well, however, to
note that the morphological and physiological sciences have not
advanced to the point where physical differences, determin-
ing mental differences, are fully understood; and yet such
ohysiological variation must exist. That is, so far as can
1 The Animal Mind p. 266

10.
be decided by physiological examination, there is no reason
whatever why two members of a like species should differ to
the degree to which they are known to differ. At the same
time it is general!?/ recognized that the difference in
mentality between the genius and the moron, among the lower
animals or among human beings, is largely a matter of
material construction, of so-called "blood lines", express-
ing hereditary traits.
In regard to the evolution of organisms, it is noted that
creatures higher In the evolutionary plane than the hydra,
begin to develop a central nervous* system. It is also seen
that the more central this nervous system is, the broader is
the range of intelligence and stronger Is the memory ability.
The crayfish with its small brain and many ganglia, arranged
in a ventral ladder system, lives a simpler life, more close-
ly bound by the environmental conditions, than does the
grasshopper with fewer ganglia and larger brain; while both
of these creatures are simpler in neurological organization,
as well as in scope of life, than the frog or the mammalia
in general. McDougall^" gives us a drawing showing the
evolution of the brain from fish to man, and even to the
careless observer there is a marked difference in the draw-
ings. Six pictures are seen: the brain of the fish, reptile,
bird, mammal, ape, man. In each case the succeeding picture
shows a distinct evolutionary advance, depicting a psysiologi-
cal construction of greater complexity. In a broad way the
1 Outline of Psychology p. 59

11.
memory ability, the power to learn, may be judged from the
organic structure of the nervous system. Simplicity of
structure marks the possessor for a low place in the
evolutionary pyramid of life, for there is no wide scope
of life possible apart from intelligence, which in turn
depends upon a complex nervous system. McDougall-'- also
pictures for us the brain of a man and the brain of an
ape, illustrating the association areas, very .prominent •
in man which "are small in the ape's brain- and are hardly
distinguishable in the brain of a dog." This again em-
phasizes the fact that the physiological and the psychical
quotient follow a like curve. From fish to reptile there
is not only a psychical evolution but a physiological
evolution also, and so is the story of the step upward from
reptile to bird and on to man. In each case a decided
evolution of the physiological, and just as decided an
evolution of the psychical, of which the memory ability
is a crucial part. For the power to remember is so import-
ant to the life of an organism, of any degree of complexity,
and where highly developed so beneficial, that the evolution
of memory may well be considered in the story of an evolution-
ary world.
As has been shown, while memory functions all through
the organic world, it is found in varying degrees in different
species, a study of these "varying degrees 7 ', that is, a
study of the memory capacity and expression, as it functions
1 Outline of Psychology p. 59
i
12.
in the life of different organisms shows a distinct evolution-
ary advance.
Referring again to illustrations given we find memory
first expressed as a simple reaction to stimulus; this re-
action having been tempered by previous experience. By the
physiological construction of the organism we see that much
memory must be purely organic in type, and this is true of
memory as it is found in the protozoa in general. ./e note
the simple metazoa,. organisms still lacking in regard to a
central nervous system, unable to associate experiences one
with another, if for no other reason, through lack of a
"thinking" center. Yet in these humble forms of life we see
memory of a higher order, than that previously mentioned,
better serving. the life of the organism, and in itself de-
noting the upward trend, even while such memory still is
of the organic type. In the illustration given of the
mollusks we see the effects of simple memory reaching over
several days or more. In the fishes we see a neurological
development of a complex nature, marking an upward step both
from the physiological and the psychical standpoint. V/e
remember the story of the pike that by the instinctive
tendency was about compelled to dash at the minnows swimming
about the tank shared in common, and yet through the effects
of previous experience was inhibited from eating the smaller
fish. So also we recall the stories of the stickleback a id
the shark that remembered satisfiers. Thether memory here
is distinctly organic in type, or whether the
(
organic has "been superseded by the associative memory is
somewhat of a problem, though to the writer such memory as
here illustrated is of the organic type. Fish coming to
the surface of a tank on "the approach of a human being, sharks
lurking about good hunting fields, and the stickleback re-
turning to its nest in each case are simple reactions to
stimuli; learned through the method of trial and error, and
found to be satisfiers. As is stated by Hobhouse^ of such
reaction to a present stimulus: "There seems no reason to
attribute it to an articulate, analogical inference." The
sort that catn be claimed for such a type of memory is that
of association between perception and impulse, and such
association entails no ''thinking" process. The story of
the chick 'wiped its bill" at the sight of the black and
A
yellow cinnarbar larvae, and the chick that ran when the
keeper took a spade in his hand, naturally raise the question
as to whether these birds did not associate the grub in
question with an unpleasant taste, and associate the keeper
and his spade with the worms that satisfied. Such an ex-
planation of the chick's actions may be given, and then would
the chick, for intellectuality, be given a high standing. But
in view of the many times when the chicken, or the adult hen,
might easily reach desired ends by a little thought, such
thought invariably being a missing factor, one is led to the
simpler explanation of the chick's conduct; that the bifcds
reacted to a present objective stimulus, the only association
present being that between perception and impulse. In
1 Kind in Evolution p. 135
('
14.
Romanes story of the cobra, Hobhou.se sees a conflict of
impulses, the impulse to swallow the toad, and that of getting
free from the aperture, working in harmony and guided in some
degree by intelligence. In the upward trend of mind develop-
ment we here have an example of memory having a guiding in-
fluence upon impulses, though the memory in question is not
of necessity associative in content.
The behavior of the wasp and the pigeon noted by
L'cDougall
,
however, introduces us to the associative memory,
for apart from such memory the actions of these creatures
would appear to be both senseless and wasteful of energy.
V/hether animals lower in the scale of organic life than
these have associative memory is perhaps doubtful, and it
is just as doubtful if many higher animals, than the wasp
and the pigeon, are rot debarred from this type of memory.
Yet it appears certain that the associative memory functions
in the life of many of the higher animals, and. the action
of those under discussion, the wasp and the pigeon, are best
explained on this basis. So is the story of the mental life'
of the raccoon, dog, elephant, ape, as well as of many other
animals. In each case we find the animals re-acting in such
way, to present stimuli, as to give the impression that they
both have and use the associative type, of memory.
It is not to be understood, however, that in the
evolutionary trend the associative displaces the organic type
of memory, but that the former functions side by side with
the latter, together giving the possessor an intellectual
1 Mind in Evolution p. 89

15.
capacity and a scope of life that otherwise would toe impossible.
Thus in the life of these higher animals and just as truly as
in the life of the lower animals the organic memory is of
vital consequence, though the higher animals have the added
advantage of being able to associate present conditions with
past experience, and are thus better enabled to judge between
satisfiers and annoyers.
So far as the evolution of the memory is concerned, the
movement is from the organic type, pure and simple, to that
memory in which the organic and the associate types function
side by side, a movement leading from memory wholly depend-
ent upon the native capacity of the physiological tissue to
retain impressions, to the physiological plus the psychical,
giving breadth and depth to the mental life.
V.'hen we remember the importance of memory in the life of
all organisms the question as to what may, and may not, of
memory advantages, be transferred by heredity or through
other means , is a pertinent one. Whatever doubt there may
be about the possibility of the transmission of particular
characteristics, it is recognized that a knowledge of facts,
that is a knowledge of the satisfiers and annoyers of life,
is never transferred. The capacity to remember alone is
transferable. The strength or weakness of this capacity is
determined by the family strain; that is, each individual
of the species passes on to its offspring such capacity
to remember as is common to that species; the ability of the
particular individual, however, within that species being
i
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largely, if not wholly, determined by hereditary traits.
The protozoan transmits to its offspring such a cap-
acity to meet the environmental conditions of life, as is
common to that particular species; and such memory ability
as is common' to those creatures is included in the trans-
mitted capacity, "hat the protozoan has learned by ex-
perience, in the struggle for life, is never transferred.
Likewise the metazoan, the fish, reptile, bird, or mammal
passes on to its offspring that ability to struggle for
life, including the memory ability, as is common to the
species. It is to be noted, however, that individuals, vary
in the memory ability, and in a like degree these members •
transmit a differing capacity to remember to their off-
spring. WiggaHT" vividly illustrates this principle that
as individuals of the human race vary in their capacity
to meet the problems of life so do the children of these
the.
individuals differ. In his citation of, Edwards and
Ismael families^, he shows how individuals beget children
like unto themselves. Yet with all the transference, it
is the capacity to learn and to do, alone, that is trans-
ferable. Factual knowledge, neither among the lower nor
the higher animals, is transferred.
Neither is there language or other ability of a like
nature for the transference of knowledge gained and re-
membered. This statement, however, must be qualified or
misunderstanding will arise. It is not insinuated that
no factual knowledge is transferred among the lower
1 The New Decalogue of Science pp. 42-53
2 Ibid p. 47
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animals, but that such transference takes place through other
means than the use of language.
Many inhibitions are taught through example, by coaxing,
by the use of particular cries. Most of us have seen the
hen, placidly caring for her chicks, startled by the approach
of a hawk. Feathers are ruffled, a piercing cry is given,
the chicks are hurriedly rushed to shelter. A state of ex-
citement and fear prevails, and undoubtedly such a state
makes a lasting impression on the chick. One who has spent
much time in the woods where. quail and grouse are plentiful
has noticed how the parent birds draw the chicks to cover
on the approach of a possible enemy. It is extremely diffi-
cult for one walking on foot to get near these timid birds,
but if one is riding with horse and wagon, and of course
making much more stir than when walking, one can approach
very closely. The chicks are taught, and the chicks learn,
to be less afraid of the larger outfit than of the man
alone. Punishment is also used as a means for transference
of knowledge. Jack London in a very picturesque way tells
of the training of some of the animals of the Wild, and
we ourselves have seen examples of such training among
domestic creatures. The mother cat will allow her kit terns
just so much license in regard to pulling and biting her
tail, and the overstepping of the bounds is quickly follow-
ed by a cuff or even a bite, and soon the little ones re-
member that specific acts are inhibited. The roosters in
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the barnyard rustle up their feathers, jump and scratch un-
til, at last, one is recognized, known and remembered as
master of the yard.
Factual knowledge, is taught in many ways by the lower
animals, but such transference is lacking in degree to what
might be taught if language, or other such ability, were
useable. Undoubtedly there is a communication of feeling,
of fear, of excitement, of anger, of the emotions in gen-
eral, but such communication is on the sensori-motor level
making it necessary that the lower animals learn very
largely through the method of trial and error. A great
step forward and upward was made in the evolution of or-
ganic life when the organism, as in the case of the man, was
given not only ability to remember, but also to speak of
things remembered.
A consideration of the memory faculty in man intro-
diices us to a higher evolutionary plane, though it is to
be noted that in many phases of memory ability man does
not differ greatly from the lower animals.
The sensori-motor memory, the memory that functions,
not because of conscious effort but because of the native
retentiveness of the ganglia, or of the central nervous
system, the sensory ir pulse being followed spontaneously
by appropriate motor response, is found in human experience;
and a great part of our well-being depends upon it. In
common with the lower animals, man derives much benefit from
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the sensori-motor factor, a factor of the distinctly or-
ganic type.
Such memory as WasKbtirn notes, as expressed in the
life of the amoeba and the Paramecium, and that feeling of
p
"Thingumbob again" which James mentions, is dependent
neither upon cerebral hemispheres, nor any nervous system
because aprotozoan is under discussion. Such memory must
be sensori-motor, dependent upon a capacity of the tissue
to retain an impression and to respond appropriately under
a second experience of a like nature. Memory, so explain-
ed, is found all through the animal world, and such memory
is physiologically grounded. Coming a little higher in
the scale of life, we have little difficulty in describ-
ing the actions of organisms in terms of "feeling of fit-
ness" such "feeling" being the motor-response conducive
to preservation of life, which is, in part, governed by
the "remembrance" of similar experiences and responses;
and we see such "feeling as the stimulus and response
of the organism as a whole. 1-hen we, however, begin to
differentiate between what is instinctive, and what is
instinctive plus purposive; between a purely organic type
of memory , as is found in the protozoan, and an associative
memory, as is found in higher animals, we immediately are
in difficulty. Yet, while the associative memory denoting
a high level of memory ability, and purposive action showing
a high grade of general intelligence are acknowledged, there
are many actions in the life of organisms, including man,
1 Th© animal Kind pp. 49, 68
2 Psychology, Briefer course p. 240

that are to be explained on the sensori-motor level. Taking
our illustrations from the life of human beings, the problem
is one of knowing what to choose out of the wealth of material
at hand. Kaudsleyl shows how, apart from the sensori-motor
memory expressed in habit, a man might be all day in dress-
ing and undressing himself. "Ye have seen the little child
struggling to make his fingers perform the desired task.
To put on a stocking correctly, lace and fasten the shoe-
strings, put on a vest, coat or gloves, is almost impossible.
To struggle through the task of lacing two shoes often
causes real fatigue. The associative memory is at work, it
is known just what needs to be done, but the material body,
the fingers, the legs, and apparently the brain matter, is
experiencing new sensations and finds difficulty in the
co-ordinating process. How different is the story of a
little while later. The dressing is done almost, and some-
times wholly, unconsciously. The body as a whole works
harmoniously, the plastic nervous tissue has been so fashion-
ed that it cares for the work in hand apart from conscious
direction. To such a degree is this true that sometimes
when one has gone to his room to change his garb, he comes
into full consciousness to find himself disrobed as though
to retire for the night. He had. begun the process of dis-
robing, lost consciousness of what he was doing, one act
automatically, as it were, followed another, the sensori-
motor memory taking care of the process, until once more
consciousness took charge.
1 Psychology of Mind p. 155
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James-*" says r, In action grown habitual, what instigates
each new muscular contraction to take place in its appoint-
ed order is not a thought or a perception, "but the sensation
occasioned by the muscular contraction just finished. A
strict voluntary act has to be guided by idea, perception
and volition throughout its whole course. In habitual act-
ion mere sensation is a sufficient guide, and the upper
regions of brain and mind are set comparatively free." The
sensori-motor memor:f is also expressed in the actions of
the somnambulist who goes through many forms and actions
of the every-day life, who "remembers" what has aforetime
been done, and yet, on awaking knows nothing of his ramblings
or actions performed.
All have seen and experienced habit as common in the
life of human beings, and all have seen the results of habit
in organisms below man; man and the lower animals alike
deriving great benefit thereby. It would indeed be diffi-
cult to see how, in his sensori-motor memory, man differs
greatly from the lower animals, but if any distinctions
were made they would of necessity be of quantity rather
than of quality.
There are, however, phases of memory which are other
than sensori-motor, and the step from one phase to the
other marks a distinct evolutionary advance. Memory in-
volving images is "a case in point. In sensation and per-
ception, consciousness is awakened by the presentation
of external objects to the sense organs. But experiences
1 Psychology p. 140
iA
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may be re-experienced without the presence of the object
itself. That is, in the so-called "mind's eye" we ma;y see,
we may image, that which, at the moment, is not present
and may not have been present for years. This image, brought
to the mind at will, is memory functioning. In addition to
the visual image, we may have images of sound, pressure, heat,
color, images of all or any sensuous experience. It is not,
however, to be understood that all possess memory involving
images in the same degree. As men vary in general, so the
ability to image previous sensations varies. Some see one
class of images very clearly and other images hardly at all.
Some people, in memory, use the image very little, while
to others the image is of great use. In general it may
be said that memory involving images is the possession of
the human race.""
Just how far down the scale of animal life memory
images are present is an interesting problem. In experiment
-
2ing with several monkeys, Hobhouse ' finds evidence not only
of associative memory but also of an originality in method
of work to reach the desired ends. "A chimpanzee learned
to use a short stick in order to reach a larger one with
which in turn he could reach the banana.'* In general the
experimenter gave the banana in a cigar box outside the cage.
The monkey using sticks, hoops, rope and an old shawl, would
push, hook and pull the box in order to bring the fruit with-
in- reach. The associative process was undoubtedly at work
in the mind, and it is difficult to understand the complicated
1 Betts G . H. "Mental Imagery"
2 Ivlind in Evolution Pp. 272, 278, 257
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movements of the monkey apart from his having some image of
the fruit desired. The same experimenter working with his
dog, "Jack" taught him to open boxes which had intricate
fastenings, to push away obstacles that made the opening of
the "box impossible. In each case the dog was attracted by
food in the box. Fere again we have evidence of the associat-
ive memory and a strong probability of memory involving
images. One approaches his sleeping dog, keeps out of sight
and gives the well-known whistle. Immediately there is a
change in the dog's attitude. The head is lifted, the eyes
are bright with what appears to be a look of expectancy; the
ears are erect and the body tense. It might be possible to
account for this change on t he sensori-motor level, the
first stimulus calling out a motor response, and each response
acting in turn as a stimulus, bringing finally the canine into
the attitude described above. But the explanation would seem
to be much nearer the truth if we saw in the dog the results
of an associative memory stimulated by a memory image of his
master
.
Many other incidents might be mentioned, supporting the
hypothesis that memory images exist among animals lower than
man, but invariably would such memory images be found in the
higher animals. Lloyd Morgan^- sees, in the chick rejecting
cinnabar-larvae and, without touching the caterpillar, wiping
its bill, "a memory of the nasty taste." If the image of
taste were here used, it would seem as though memory involving
1 Habit and Instinct pp. 40,42
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images functioned among some of the lower animals. In any
case, however, memory involving images is of a distinctly
higher type than the sensori-motor memory, and marks con-
siderable evolutionary advance.
A memory of past experiences is by no means to be
separated from the memory images which were mentioned above.
In fact, here we see the image functioning to the end that
we remember past experiences. Among members of the human
race past experiences are remembered as such. Sometimes
consciousness brings the image into play and in the image of the
past the experiences are again lived, incident by incident.
Sometimes the result of the experiences alone is remembered,
the image being neglected for the time being, but brought
into play as desired. At times, however, the image may
have disappeared, memory of the succeeding incidents being
entirely out of reach and the conclusion of the experiences,
that is, the impression of the experiences on the individual,
alone is remembered. One who had spent much time under the
influence of intoxicating liquor testified, to the writer,
that oftentimes he had no idea where he went, what he spent,
what he did, or how much liquor he drank, but he did kno?/
that he had a good time. He was unable to image any of
the experiences, of the riotous time, but the result in
totality of the various experiences was vividly remembered.
In each case satisfiers and annoyer are remembered, and
the knowledge at hand is used according to the desire of the
individual. It is not human nature, a >parently, to shun all

annoyers and use all satisfiers, for all from time to time
"play with fire", experiment with, and use that which men
count an annoyer; and just as often we refuse to benefit
"by the common satisfier. Yet, all in all, men govern their
lives according to things remembered, and more or less un-
consciously, life 'becomes a building process. Amid the play
of memory-iriages we select that which serves, rejecting that
which has caused annoyance, and grow wiser with the passing
years
.
Imagination is, primarily, the power or process of
having mental images; and, broadly, the power or process
of forming ideal constructions from images, concepts, and
feelings, with relative freedom from objective restraint.
Thus imagination is linked up 7/ith, or really is, memory.
Imagination, however, is part of the associative, not the
organic type of memory; and in the process of imaginative
thinking we remember In part or in whole, through the power
of imagery, the experiences of the past. Sometimes, as will
now be shown, we re-shape the images of the past to fit
present and future conditions of life.
The first appearance of Imagination in the evolutionary
scheme is extremely problematical. Close study of the lower
animals reveals many situations which are difficult to ex-
plain apart from that which we term imagination. It is
generally acknowledged that in the higher animals, revealing
associative memory, imagination plays its part. While among
these animals, images may be more or less vague, closely
related to the concrete and immediate, we have the dawn of
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that imagination mode of thought which in man places him
at the apex of evolutionary development. Two phases of t his
imaginative life have heen named "Flights of Fancy", and the
"Forward Look".
The mental images which come to us as "Flights of Fancy"
are often so intangible that they are well named "Day Dreams."
Thus we see the adolescent hoy living the life of the dashing
cavalier or of a roaming pirate, scott ' s "ivanhoe" takes him
hack through the centuries, places him in a new environment,
and enables the youth to experience that which in reality is
utterly foreign to the day in which he lives. With Steven-
son's "Treasure Island" he walks the silvery sands of the
islands of the seas, and experiences the thrills of many
a bloody battle. In a like way the girls dreams her day-
dreams, waits for and soes the coming of a Knight. Around
her she sees armor-clad warriors battling for the smiles
she will bestow upon the victorious one, or, transfering
her imagination to conditions of her own day, she sees
herself snuggling down on the cushions of a Pierce-Arrow
wrapped, in costly furs. Such are the dreams of developing
youth but just as real are the day-dreams all normal people
dream of what would be accomplished if only the conditions
of life were different.
Judged by pragmatic standards these day-dreams are
factual since they have a real place in the life of man. They
minister to his ambitions; they help pass away many moments
in a pleasing fashion, making possible, for the moment, life
i
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in a world of His own fabrication. Macawber does not stand
alone as one whose greatest excitement in life consists in
"waiting for something to turn up."
The story has been told under many forms of the old
hunting dog whose days in the field were long-gone by, and
who yet went into an ecstasy of delight at the sight of traps
or gun. Most of us have seen the excitement of a dog when
its master asks such a familiar question as "want to go out?"
The canine under such conditions shows the same type of overt
responses as does the little one who is asked if he wants
one of his toys, or if he wishes to go out. The child cries
or babbles in such a way as to make the hearer think he
visualizes the experience beforehand. Perhaps in a like
way the dog images what has been and what is to be in the
immediate future. One difference, however, between the dog
and the human being is noted, and that not simply one of
possible range of imagination. So far as we know neither
the dog nor any other member of the organic world below man,
has such power of imagination as will enable him to find much
of the joy of life in visualizing experiences that have not,
and probably never will, materialize. And such power of
imagination may well be counted as a high mark in evolutionary
progress
.
The example is often given of the facial contortions of
the sleeping dog, of the growls and overt expressions of
excitement in the animal as he lies at rest. But between the
animal that twitches, snarls and growls when asleep, and the
1 Hind in Evolution Chapts. XI, XII. "Animals limited t o
concrete and practical"

Macawber v/ho sits at ease in his chair dreaming of what an
important man he will he sometime in the future, there is
little comparison. The movements of the dog may be likened
to those of the human being who dreams, or even to the
somnambulist who apparently is acting rationally, yet v/ho
still sleeps. The actions in both cases may be relegated
to the subconscious spheres, or as James would express it to
the Subliminal. On the other hand, the one who lives mid
"Flights of Fancy " is in the realm of conscious experience,
and such Flights as have been noted, may be counted a mark
of progress.
In memory man looks backward, while in his visions of
and for the future he looks forward. Utilizing the advantages
of memory and memory images, man looks into the future and
plans accordingly. Kepner^ well calls man the most prescient
of animals, for man, as no other creature, plans for the
days and years yet to be experienced and lived.
Just how much the lower animals consciously plan for
the future, is another of those interesting and debatable
questions. That they do plan is unquestionable; how much the;f
"consciously" plan is the question. Kepner spends much time
in relating how many organisms, one might almost say organisms
in general, prepare in the course of their ordinary activities
those conditions that will make the preservation of life and
the propogation of the species possible. That all organisms
noted make the preparations consciously is not claimed by the
author. One of the reasons for doubting whether the ant, as i
1 Animals Looking Into the Future.

works, consciously forsees the end. to "be reached is that the
ant genetically and intellectually has made so little progress,
if any at all, during the millenniums ants have been living.
If the ant has the capacity of mind ''to think" its way through
the social life of the colon;y, then surely in the course of
ages some change would have taken place.
But what of the dog burying its bones, the squirrel
hording nuts for the winter season, bees filling the hive
with honey while the flowers bloom? What of the ground hog
putting by in the fall tender sprigs that will not be used
until fed to the growing family in the spring? Have not
these animals some gleam of purpose in their methods? Many
of the higher animals are undoubtedly purposive in some of
their actions; as in illustrations given of dog "jacK" and
chimpanzee and cebus monkeys. Each in turn work and struggle
to obtain desired ends and each apparently, had knowledge
of the end in view. But the former illustrations as of the
dog burying the bone are somewhat different from the latter
ones, in that these, the dog Jack and the chimpanzee monkeys,
dealt with concrete situations of immediate consequence, while
the former deal with wants that were not to be experienced for
months. How much "purpose" is there in the minds of the an-
imals laying by food not to be used, for present need.s? Here
again we find ourselves in the realm of the debatable, though
when we remember the hones that are buried and which very
often are never again disturbed; when we see the little kitten
trying to cover particles of refuse in the middle of a hard-
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wood floor, and the squirrel"*- attempting to hide a nut in
the middle of a rug, going through all the processes of
burying the food and then leaving it fully in view; when we
see a dog, as happened . in my yard hut a few days ago, take
a dog-biscuit , lay it on a tuft of grass, work around with
his nose as though to bury the food, and while the food v/as
still in plain view walk away perfectly satisfied, yet a
few minutes later when other food had disappeared make a
frantic search, and a long search, for the biscuit in full
view only a few yards away, we have cause to ask if that
which has often been termed "purposive" is not blind instinct.
These preparations for needs yet six months in the future
are to be classed with preparations of the bear that fills
its stomach, puts on heavy layers of fat, and seeks out a
dark and cozy cave, all preparatory to w inter hibernation^;
all these being illustrations of the instinctive faculty at
work.
The work that is performed as a result of a Forward Look
is distinctly purposive, giving rise to the contention that
it is not on the instinctive, the physiological, but on the
psychical level. Illustrating this point, Hobhouse holds
that the hen clucking to her chicks and the mother planning
out her child's education with a view to physical health,
growth in character, and profession to be taken up twenty
years hence offer no basis of comparison.
The former is on the physiological, the latter on the
psychical level. They both ma;y be swayed by the parental
1 Habit and Instinct p. 123 5 Ibid 315
2 Kind in Evolution p. 183
I
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instinct, "but there is a difference in comprehensiveness
of aim. "In man alone is there an intelligent subordination
of desire of the present for the sake of a future good."
The Forward Look is positive rather than negative in effect.
In Flights of Fanc;y one's wishes are revealed, but where one
is content to stay in the realm of "Fancy" little is likely
to be realized. In Fancy there is little expenditure of effort,
for one may be so at ease, in such a state of lethargy, that
the brain tissue may be storing energy. In his visions for
the future man not only dreams but begins to work that those
dreams may be materialized. Will, volition, is brought into
play; the mind is at work and nervous energy expended. Some-
time ago a popular caricature showing the college student
at work and at play was broadcast through the newspapers. in
the first picture, "At Play" the young man was doing every-
thing possible in the rough and tumble of a foot ball game.
In the second picture, "At Work" the same young fellow was
in his study clad in a bath robe, lolling at ease in a com-
fortable chair, feet on table and pipe In mouth, and a
diminutive book in hand. But it is possible to see some
truth even in the caricature, u-u.tward.ly at ease, the
student in the study may have been expending energy at a
pace impossible on the foot ball field. leaking plans, turn-
ing them down, rebuilding, shaping, changing; worrying,
sweating, at times wildly excited at a possible solution to
the problem at hand, and the next moment, on the bubbles
1 Mind in Evolution p. 315
i
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bursting, cast into deep despair. As one plans out his life
or the life of another, seeking to make the most of his past
experiences, ever groping in his memory for knowledge to aid
i: the future, the Forward Look becomes distinctly positive
in effect.
In this Forward Look the creative imagination is at
work. Things remembered and combinations used are reviewed,
analyzed and rebuilt into new combinations. Experiments are
made, ideas and elements together are tested, and out of
the imagination a new creation comes forth. It ma;y" be of
world-wide importance, of local consequence, or of account
only to its creator, yet nevertheless out of memory plus
imagination something new is given to the world, and here
we are on a high level of evolutionary development.
ICemory as first seen among the lower organisms is
purel;/ organic, and such retentiveness as is noted is based
on the retentativeness of the tissue as a whole, at this
time there being no distinct nervous organization. To
account for such memory or to und.er stand how the organism
can know is impossible, '."e cannot wonder at the explanation,
which really is no explanation, that the organism acts
instinctively. Ascending the scale of organic life, we see
a differentiation among the cells composing the little
creatures, and a nervous organization is fashioned, in a
most simple form at first. The scope of life is broadened,
memory is more serviceable yet still on the sensori-motor
level. The organic gradually gives place to the associative
<1
memory, the higher animals are seen to associate conditions,
things, people in general, and lastly individuals, with the
annoyers and satisfiers of life. Purposiveness is acknowledged
as being part of the mental life of the animal world below
man and we see organisms making use of memory to obtain de-
sired results. Lastly we see man remembering experiences
past, using knowledge of them for present gain, and also
using his knowledge in reaching out into a world and into
a day still to be, actually subjugating the self of the
present for the self of the future.
It is not that the physical man is to be discarded,
giving way to the purely psychical, for we know of no thought
apart from a physiological thinking, organism. The material
is necessary if we are to experience the psychical; but with
the advent of man, the physiological was relegated to a
secondary place, or at least made to share places with the
psychical. With the process of time and with the evolution
of the Memory and Imaginative faculty, the physiological
began to lose sway while the psychical began to dominate
the life-forces.
A study in the evolution of the mind must of necessity
consider the problem of conceptual thought and language, the
latter making the former to be of universal rather than of
individual worth. Conceptual thought is also noted as an
added mental faculty making possible the greatest use of
the memory ability, in that the parts forming the objective
world are seen and remembered in their various relationships,
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and again language is used, to give that knowledge to the
world. The wide range of the mental faculty, making it •
possible to live again in the days and years gone by, and
at the same time use the knowledge obtained in the work of
the creative imagination, would not be possible apart from
conceptual thought. It is seen, then, that in the life of
the highest organisms memory and imagination, conceptual
thought and language, are but four phases of the same mental
capacity.
In the formation of the Concept the "world of ideas" be
comes a possibility. ,/ithin this world is to be found the
power of abstraction, generalization, judgment, reasoning,
but after all, these are only more or less loose terms, in
part synonymous, by which we attempt to describe the actual
thinking process of the mind. The concept is a mental
picture, a symbol with a general meaning, representing a
certain organization of experience. James gives to us
a good working definition when he writes^, "The function
by which we mark off, discriminate, draw a line round, and
identify a numerically distinct subject of discourse is
called conception.
"
As has been shoy/n in the discussion of the Forward
Look in regard to purposive thinking and acting, the higher
animals below man are limited in thought to the concrete
and practical; and while they show the power of grasping
perceived relations and applying them afresh to new and
1 James, psychology, Briefer Course, pp. 239, 240.
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different circumstances, the intelligence shown remains
within concrete experience; and the cunning, caution,
sagacity, of the kind of which :! animal stories" are so full,
do not, as a rule, imply anything more or less than this same
concrete experience. Virile James holds that "creatures
extremely low in the animal scale may have conception--all
that is required is that they should recognize the same
experience again. A polyp may be a conceptual thinker if
a feeling af 'Hello, thingumbob againl ' ever flitted through
its mind"--that definition of conceptual thought as ability
to break up perceptions, to see relationships between com-
ponent parts, the parts and relationships being catalogued for
future reference, lifts it entirely out of the npolyp" class.
Conceptual thought involves analysis of situations, a separa-
tion of elements from any combinations aforetime experienced,
and these combinations are seen not only in their entirety,
in the mass, but as parts united for a purpose. A month
old police-puppy became a member of our family some little
time ago, and soon we began to notice that the door of the
ice chest, kept in the shed adjoining the kitchen, where
the puppy spent much of its time, "was often found open and
food was missing from the chest. On being watched secretly
the puppy was seen to nose around the latch which fastened
the door, and to easily gain desired ends. While at first
somewhat clumsy in method, the puppy became quite adept at
opening the door by the time it was three months old. Clearly
certain elements in the perception had b^en singled out. The
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latch became the immediate object of attention when food was
in the chest, and the puppy was alone; but there was no reason
for thinking that the analysis in question went beyond the
point of separating one object or event from other objects
or events. That is, the puppy understood fumbling with his
nose about the latch as part of the desired end—the open door.
A man or child strange to ice chests or containers with
latches might unexpectedly open the door through the trial
and error method used by the dog, but having done so might
examine the latch, notice its shape, its size, and thus learn
that it was a kind of lever moving on a fulcrum in accordance
with certain mechanical laws. In the latter case the propert-
ies of the latch would be separated one from another, and from
the latch as a particular object. The principle by 7/hich
the latch operated would be understood, and knowledge of the
principle laid by in the form of a concept to be used under
like or totally different conditions. The concept is thus
a "thought-function" which has mastered a relationship between
elements and parts which can be constructed and used as
needed. In conceptual thought, then, we have that analysis
and synthesis so common among men but found nowhere else
in organic life. Hobhouse^ tells us of the chimpanzee,
Consul, that not only could understand the use of the key
to his cage, and could as desired use the key to obtain liberty
but also could fashion from a stick a rough tool that would wor
as a key. ./hat was needed was a square key, and the monkey
would bite the stick until it would fit the square key-hole.
1 Mind in Evolution, p.- 294
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I;:ere again, on the part of the monkey, v/e have a clear
understanding, based on experience, of the relations between
two objects, and the facing and solving of a practical
problem. But if this clever chimpanzee had had no experience
with keys, but had in some .way been able to get a knowledge !
of them through contact with monkeys so experienced, or
if the monkey's trainer had been able to explain to it the
use of keys, we would have known that these lower animals
had conceptual thoughts and could understand Principles
as distinct from Objects. By a consideration of the data
at hand, however, v/e are led to the conclusion that no
animal below man experineces conceptual thought, or en-
joys the advantages such thought carries.
In the Concept intellectuality is made possible, and
abstract thought with its many variations holds sway.
Building on this ability to break up perceptions and see
relationships, higher education, science, agriculture,
art, professional and business activity become possible.
Man launches into what he holds to be an imperfect universe
and begins to fashion it to his own liking. Bergaon-*- sees
the whole animal \vorld, excepting man, "The captive of
the mechanisms it has set up. Automatism winds about it
and drags it down. It has not the power to escape, because
the energy it has provided for acts is almost all employed
in maintaining the Infinitely subtle and essentially un-
stable equilibrium into which it has brought matter. But
man not only maintains his machine, he succeeds in using
1 Creative Evolution, p. 264
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it as he pleases. 1 ' Bergson sees man as part of the organic
world, related to and governed in a large degree by the
laws underlying organic life, and yet having in his power
to "create" as has not heretofore been done, and to mold
both his own life and the world in which he lives. James
in a like way, sees man, through the power of conceptual
thought, change the world in which he lives. :, In our cog-
nitive as well as in our active life we are creative. 7e
add, both to the subject and to the predicate part of reality.
The world stands ready malleable, waiting to receive its
final touches at our hands. Man 'engenders' truths upon it."
We see these principles in operation every day. The young
man, viewing the picture of a modern Apollo and dreaming
of himself with a like physique, systematically thinks
and works to the desired end and actually re-creates his
physiological being. In a like way one "thinks" himself
into the cult of the intellectuals". Through regular
habits of reading and thinking the ambitious youth mounts
the ladder leading to Tisdom, while those who laughed
laugh no longer. Perhaps the struggling one has heard the
words of the Determinist and been told that all his move-
ments are shaped by the play of hereditary traits and en-
vironmental forces
,
yet he still feels himself to be the
possessor of a vital force that will enable him, if he
perseveres, to reach heights otherwise unattainable, and
to accomplish ends otherwise impossible. In other words,
he feels a sense of freedom of action and thought, that
makes him to be, in greater or lesser degree, the shaper of
his own destiny.
3c Pragmatism, p. 257
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.lien we consider the problem of ideation we are immediately
brought into contact with the idealizing tendency. Just as
memory finds its highest expression in the creative faculty,
so conceptual thought, working in the realm of ideation,
finds its highest expression in the idealizing factor.
Stratton^ gives us a good working definition of this tendency
as he writes; "The Ideal is the picture of what will satisfy
in fullest measure our desires." "The Ideal is what possess-
es deepest significance, supreme in its mastery over all
our powers.
In general the worlds of ideas and ideals work side
by side in the same individual, alike dependent on con-
deptual thought, and on man thinking of himself as dis-
tinct from a material universe. In accounting for Ideals
we are referred to "social ideas" and "group consciousness",
and Breese^ tells us that "these sentiments," the ideal,
"form about relatively stable centres of ideas and intellectual
processes." IvIcDougall sees the development of idealization
in the play and interplay of social life, in which that
which serves the social group is counted "good i; . That is,
that which serves in the preservation of the social group
is idealized, and is counted the "good." Eut while it is
difficult to account for the ideal, its presence is un-
doubtable and its force immeasurable • Galloway^ expounding
his theory of the ideal, in terms of "Ought Consciousness"
acknov/ledges that it is difficult to account for it, but
nevertheless it is present. The same author tells us that
1 The Psychology of the xieligious Life, pp. 327, 345
2 Psychology, p. 376
3 Social Psychology pp. 217-235
4 Principles of Religious Development pp. 241, 245
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the desire for the Ideal, as it influences and sways its
possessor, makes its power felt in a peculiar way. It comes
to one as an ethical obligation, yet it is always tempered
with the feeling that the right of choice rests unreservedly
with the individual.- t5The ethical obligation is always
construed as an "Ought", never as a '''Must," and accordingly
postulates in the individual the power to choose. The
feeling involved in "Ought has a quality peculiar to itself;
there is nothing just like it in the range of our experience;
its ground would seem to lie deeper than the region of
psychology." This idealizing tendency or "Ought-Consciousness
as Galloway names it, brings its own problems as to origina-
tion and its place in the life of the human race, We see,
however, that such a "tendency" is impossible apart from
conceptual thought expressing itself in the ideational
faculty, and to the writer this desire for the Ideal is the
highest expression of this Conceptual Thought.
Illustrations of this phase of life are not difficult to
find. Shakespeare In his "Merchant of Venice" gives us t he
picture of the ignorant servant, Launcelot G-obbo, who would
run but does not, who would flee to save himself but stays
at the voice of conscience. Over and over again the story is
told of those who, for the sake of an abstract ideal, instead
of running, stay to fight, though they consciously fight a
q
losing battle. Tennyson portrays the spirit of the soldier
of all ages, who at any cost will uphold the honor of his
regiment, as he writes:
1 Principles of Religious Development pp. 244, 245
2 The Charge of the Light Brigade
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Cannon to the right of them,
Gannon to the left of them,
Cannon in front of them
Volley »d and thunder 1 d.
Stormed at with shot and shell,
Boldly they rode and well,
Into the jaws of Death.
Into the mouth of Hell
Rode the six hundred.
Someone had blundered; the order to charge was a mistake
but: "Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die;"
and death followed.
While most are ready to agree with the assertion that
"self-preservation is the first law of nature," we are aware
of the numberless times in which men have readily sacrificed
life for the ideal. This is the story of the religious martyr
of Nero*s day, and of the days both before and after. This
is the story of the many, long fights for personal and
national liberty, as expressed in the Revolutionary and Civil
Vars in this country, and in the battle for freedom in other
lands. The history of the human race as a whole is, in
large part, a series of tragedies gathered around the lives
of those whose ideals were of greater value than was life.
As McDougall sees the rise of the idealizing tendency in
the "good" of the social group, so Fite-1- finds an expression
of this same tendency in the individual losing himself in
the life of society. To the child, that which
1 An Introductory .'Study of ethics p. 214
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serves bodily appetites is to be sought, and-*- the surest
road to his favor is a present of candy or cake". The ideals
of the young man are still to a large extent colored by
bodily self-seeking, but he also reaches into the world
about him. As the head of the family, his interests are
still broadened and at times "self-preservation" is not
even considered. "Every advance in maturity brings to light
capacities of appreciation of which he was hitherto unaware.
There is therefore a constantly increasing identity of self
with other selves, !J and the material fades into insignificance
before the strength of ths ideal. The sculptor, who, above
all things values Art, lives in poverty rather than lower his
standards, though offered material wealth to lower them, by
no means stands alone. The musician, ever groping for
"Lost Chords" yet never finding them; ever working and hop-
ing for that melody which will be an inspiration to his
fellows, only to fail; starving rather than live in luxury
at the price of composing trashy tunes, is not impossible
to find. As in the life of the home, so in social and
national life, there are those who,, seeing an ultimate good
for society, are ready to deny self. This fact has never
been more truly exemplified than in the life of Lincoln. In
his days at the Capitol, bodily comforts were not considered;
home life was almost non-existent; material self-seeking
never entered his horizon. Speaking of the love that one
might well have for his country, a love which permeated his
2
own life, he said: - " "From these honored dead we take in-
1 An Introductory 3tudy of Ethics p. 214
2 Gettysburg Address
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creased devotion to that cause for which they gave the
last full measure of devotion." And as they had given all
for the sake of an ideal, so did he.
Thus the human being, through the power of conceptual
thought, reaching back through the years, and building life
as it is to be lived in the days yet to come, is, through
the idealizing faculty, separated yet more from the lower
animals. Eergson well says, :ln the last analysis, man might
considered the reason for the existence of the entire organ-
ization of life on our planet. !i
Understanding language as a medium for the crystaliza-
tion of conceptual though, the spoken and the written word,
we introduce the question as to whether language in any
degree is found among animals lower than man. The theory
that animals talk has many supporters both among scholars
2
and among the rank and file of animal lovers. Dr. Evans
very strongly supports the idea that language is not the
possession of man alone. He holds that animals may speak
by means of a language composed of sounds and actions, or
of a combination of the two, at present unknown to man.
To support this view he shows that the dog has different
barks expressing different feelings. There is the bark
used in the chase, the yelp of despair, the bay of night
time, the bark of joy, of anger, of supolication. We are
also told that the magpie has the concept of "four 1- ' as
distinct from other numbers even though it does not say
"four", just as the deaf and dumb mute may think logically
1 Creative Evolution- p. 184
2 Evolution, Ethics and Animal Psychology, pp. 282-287

though unable to speak, while some Australian Bushmen are
able to count only three. Again, we are told that the Veddahs
of Ceylon communicate by grimaces and gutterals which remind
one very forcibly of some actions and sounds found in the
animal world. Evans by no means stands alone in his views,
for all have heard the stories of cats, and horses, and • •
particularly of dogs, that "talk i? .
In regard to the barks of a dog, may we not find in
them the expression of differing impulses and excitement?
The afferent nerves are stimulated to a different degree
or in a different fashion, or what is more likely, different
neurons are stimulated under different circumstances. It
is hardly to be expected that the proximity of a bone and
the rays of a silvery moon will give either the same im-
pulse or call forth the same type of response in the dog.
The claim that the animal is stimulated and is responsive
very largely on the sensori-motor level does not seem un-
reasonable. The cries of animals may be likened to a
simple form of language in so far as such cries are "pur-
posive", and uttered in order to affect? the behavior of others,
as in the angry barking of a dog that frightens away the
intruder; but there is such a degree of spontaneity about
the barks, a spontaneity that is curbed only by much train-
ing, as to relegate the ;i cries" to a classification fairly
near the sensori-motor. In the same way the hen responds
to the stimulation largely on the sensori-motor level, as
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she utters the cry of pain, the cry of anger when disturbed
on the nest, the call to chicks when food is at hand, the
more shrill call to chicks when danger arises, and the tone
of exaltation that advertises the laying of an egg. The
claim that the hen in her cries is trying to reach the mind
of the chicks with an "idea" would sound more- reasonable if
the hen in othor phases o*f life exhibited ; ideas". As it
is, the bird seems to live largely on the sensori-motor
level, the instinctive action, however, being supported by
some degree of intelligence making purposive action possible.
Evans-'- simply makes the assertion that the magpie "thinks 4"
and we are left to assume the tests which he used to reach
this conclusion. If his data is found in the response of
the bird to the number of the eggs or young in the nest, it
is conceivable that the bird may not need to be able to
"think 4" and yet betray uneasiness if eggs or young number
either above or below that number, for the "feel" of four
eggs may act as a satisfier, while that of any number other
than four as an annoyer. It Is, however, unsatisfactory
to argue about data unknown. Pew would claim that the common
barnyard fowl counts to 13 or 14, and yet it is common
knowledge that the hen having laid approximately this
number of eggs will stop laying and give attention to
brooding the eggs; while if a nest egg or two alone, be
left, "biddy" will keep up the good work until some thirty
or forty eggs have been laid, before taking a rest. In
1 Evolutionary Ethics and Animal Psychology
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Case a good "setting" of eggs be left in the nest it must
act as a satisfier that changes the laying for the breedin
propensity. Undoubtedly we are here on the sensori-motor
level and this, too, seems to be the level on which Evans'
magpie lives.
The actions of sentinel and social animals are very
difficult to understand unless we assume that they have
considerable intelligence in addition to their power to
act instinctively. Here, again, "purposive" methods are
used, by these animals to great advantage. One does not
make many gunning trips after waterfowl without noticing
ways, or habits of these birds that speak of considerable
intelligence. The honking geese will not alight upon the
open water without taking note of suspicious objects, and
even when all seems to be peaceful, feeding seldom begins
without sentry on duty. /e read of such sentries among
crows in the newly planted cornfield, among herds of wild
horses, among mountain sheep, buffalo, and deer; and in
each case considerable intelligence, both in setting and
changing the sentry, is displayed. But in each case the
work done by the sentry in giving assurance necessary
for feeding or in giving the call to repel attack, or
to find 'safety in flight, can be done as well without as
with the aid of language, and can be well accomplished
on the sensori-motor level. The startled rabbit or
sheep stamps as he begins to run, the attention of the
1 Hobhouse, Mind in .^volution, pp. 309f.

group Is attracted, and the stampede naturally begins. The
nervousness of the sentry-horse, when danger arises, quickly
reaches the companions of the clique and the flight of one
sets all in motion. The alarm cry and the response to the
cry are no doubt instinctive reactions to appropriate stimuli,
perfected perhaps "by experience, and such cries and reactions
are all that are necessary for the safety of the species.
"Turn and turn about ;! is the method for sentry duty, and
If one shirks his task, confusion arises; while a time for
eating and a time for resting best fill the needs both of
the individual and of the group. In the case of the
solitary animal, sentinel duty must be performed while
eating and resting, but In the case of the social animals,
the "trial and error method" results in one acting sentinel
for the group. Sometimes confusion arises through lack
of some member being willing to continue as sentry, or
through the lack of one who is willing to go on duty; the
confusion sometimes resulting in a bite. But in each case
adjustments to the need are made without the aid of language.
The question as to whether ants and bees in the complexity
of their social life make use of a language has for many
years been an open one. '•Evans makes the dogmatic statement
that every creature has a language of its own; and while
authors quoted by Lubbock2
,
hold that social hymenoptera
"use a kind of language which is mutually understood",
Lubbock himself is somewhat doubtful on the subject, and
makes quite a number of tests which lead him to the conclusion
1 Evolution, ethics and Animal Fsychology pp. 282, 287
2 Ants, Bees and ./asps, p. 153

that ants do not possess n any considerable power of des-
criptive communication""'", "though they, no doubt, do
possess some power of the kind." A careful canvassing of
Lubbock's and other experimental data at hand, leads the
writer to the conclusion that "descriptive communication"
was not necessary to produce the effects mentioned.
Different degrees of excitement shown "by returned foraging
ants may well have accounted for the greater parties
following one ant than another; and much excitement may have
resulted, in each case where ants "told" of prey, in the
"relief parties". While the apparent impossibility of ants,
being able to reach the stores unless they were led or had
a scent to follow, points to the conclusion of there having
been no "descriptive communication". Instinctive reaction
to stimulus plus enough intelligence to give a purposive
trend to the conduct well accounts for the explanation
needed in accounting for the actions of the ants.
In c onclusion, then, we are led t o the opinion that
while sentinel and social animals display remarkable
instinctive traits and these traits are supported by in-
telligence sufficient to make purposive action both possible
and probable, Language, as the expression of conceptual
though, is neither needed nor used in the life of these
organisms
.
To those who thoroughly believe that birds talk, the
fact that no talking birds are found in native haunts should
appear strange. If language were a natural part of bird life,
1 Ants, Bees and '/asps, p. 172
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then in the native habitat of the animal that ability should
come to its peak of perfection. The fact remains, however,
that every 'talking 5 ' "bird is, or has been directly or indirect-
ly, in a human environment; which leads to the conclusion
that whatever ability along this line is noted, it has been
added from the environment, rather than having been de-
veloped from a native capacity. Undoubtedly the vocal chords
the mechanics of speech, are present in many birds, and if
talking were simply vocalizing, then birds would "speak".
But language is more than this. In fact vocalizing is a
comparatively insignificant part of the process.
As memory and imagination are so closely related that
they may be counted as different phases of the same principle
ao conceptual thought and language are interdependent, the
latter depending for content upon the former. The parrot,
repeating the phrase "Good-night" never analyzes "Good"
and ''Night", and has no conception of what the compound
word may mean. The bird cries, "Polly wants a cracker :! and
cries, and screams, until the delicacy is forthcoming. To
the casual observer the bird knew what it wanted and how
to get it, and roughly speaking the conclusion would be
true. But if one were to conclude that the bird knew it-
self as "Polly", and in the vaguest sense that the human
might understand the terms, the bird understood the mean-
ing of the verb "wants", the conclusion would be a false
one. Strange though it may seem, the bird vocalizes on
the same "principle of life" as the dog yelps or "sits up"

50.
for food. Both animals are working by the trial and. error
method, and having found, with or without specific training,
that such and such a position of the "body, a certain yelp, or
cry brings a satisfier rather than an annoyer, continue to
use such methods. In training a bird to n talk !! , exactly
the same method is used as that in training song birds. In
each case a whistle, trill, word, or sentence, is given time
and time again. Efforts to imitate are rewarded, and
gradually the bird realizes that song or "talk" brings results
The parrot, then, simply uses the art of mimicry, an art
common among lower and higher animals; and having vocal
chords somewhat similar to those in man, is enabled to pro-
duce the "talk", hut having no conception of word-meaning it
is yet unable to speak.
In c onclusion, then, we may say that as far as com-
parative psychology can ascertain, the parrot and the dog,
along with animals other than man, refrain from speaking
not because of the lack of vocal chords, but because of the
lack of ideas; and the pussy that looks at one with such
a plaintive air keeps silent because of having nothing to
say.
In the last analysis, language is in the closest sense
concomitant with conceptual thought. So close does the re-
lationship between the two appear, that Dr. Ward is at a
loss to say which, if either, of the two, first came to
fruition. He is of the opinion that in the process of
evolution they developed side by side as two flowers on the
same stem.
1 .psychological Principles

01 .
Galloway^ approximately holding to 'ard's view says:
'It would be difficult to over-estimate the value of con-
ceptual thinking, which is made possible by language, to
human progress.' 1 And again: "The development of conceptual
thought by the help of language is the achievement of man."
Words, peculiar sounds, have particular meanings, and
they represent things and simple ideas. The little child
of two years is attracted by a passing conveyance and cries
"Ta, Ta", clearly conveying idea of an automobile. The
little fellow takes some hot food in his mouth, and amid
the cries of pain, the monosyllable "o-o" is heard. The
exclamation is not simply as the pain-yelp of the dog, for
in addition to the pain-cry there is exjjressed the idea of
hotness, as distinct froia all other physical states and con-
ditions. Though the child gives what appears to be simply
a cry of pain, a far more simple sound than many of those given
while,
by the parrot,^ the parrot "mimics", the child "speaks", in
that he expresses an idea in such a form as might be under-
stood by another. Language, then, contains at least these
two elements. First, the Idea which the. term is to express,
is analyzed out of the perceptions of experience, the Idea
being capable of combination with other simple ideas; and
secondly the word expressing the idea is understood, in its
meaning, by the hearer. Thus in language we have the con-
ceptual thought of the individual transferred by sounds, as
in words vocalized, by motions as in the words, letters or
syllables of the deaf and dumb modes of speech, or in the
1 Principles of Religious Development pp* 86, 280.
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gestures and the facial expression of the same, or in the
written and. printed words of all types and languages, to
the minds of other individuals. A child of one and a half
years, when given food that did not please, said, "Ernie do^n
li liver." The liver, known to he repugnant to the child had
been cut very small and mixed with considerable potato^ and \s
gravy. The baby tasted the food, recognized the objection-
able meat, expressed his distaste for it in very strange
English, but undoubtedly made the family aware of his un-
pleasant reaction to the food given.
Building on the development of conceptual thinking and
the interchange of thought through language, a knowledge of
the satisfiers and annoyers of today is communicated one to
the other, from parent to child, from teacher to pupil, as
is impossible for any animals below man. "hereas most
animals receive the greater part of their knowledge of the
satisfiers and annoyers through practical experience, the
members of the human race, through language advantages,
are enabled to draw on the experiences of the race as a
whole. Past experience, including the accumulated tradi-
tion of the race, is used in an organized form in guiding
conduct. Self, family, society, use this past experience
for future good. In the evolution of organic life the
germ of intelligence has been present right along; in-
telligence enough at any rate to enable the organism to
choose between a satisfier and an anno; er. Instinct,
coupled with some degree of intelligence, shaped the destiny
I
53.
of the individual and the species, but the evolution of a
higher organism, with its fuller life and higher organiza-
tion was extremely slow. Organic life depended through the
ages upon this orthogenic evolution, and it was only when
experience was so far systematized that the future was read
in the light of the past, that the complex life of the
present day civilization became a possibility.
nc.lu.sion ^-n^-w-s^-v^->_^ -^w-w-w-»>
As stated before, the object of the thesis is to show
the .trend of mind development in the evolutionary process,
and to this end a few phases of the life of organisms have
been covered. It was not intended to touch upon origins,
or upon the upward steps between species on different levels
of life, or to explain how the evolutionary process came
to be or to have power to "carry on"; but simply to show
that in the evolution of the mind, certain factors were
present from the very beginning, and to these were added
quantity and quality enabling the factors to produce re-
sults otherwise impossible. It is also intended to show that
factors already present in the lowest forms of organic life,
other factors became associated making possible life as
known today in all its complexity.
As first seen, organic life is molded by the power of
environmental conditions; each act of the organism being a
response to a stimulus or set of stimuli which, under
ordinary circumstances, gives the result conducive to the
preservation and the perpetuation of life. But, if for
any reason such conditions change, there is practically
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no power in the organism, to adjust itself for a new type
of life. Response to stimulus at this time is the outcome
of an inherited structure, and the only possibility for
improvement in the species is an inherited structure a
little better suited to environmental conditions. The
organism so favored would tend to be "selected" in the
struggle for life. We speak of Memory being present in the
protozoans and the lower metazoans, and illustrations of
such memory have been given, but in reality the word T'emory
is a misnomer, for the ordinary sense of the term these
lower animals have no power to remember. What we notice in
the amoeba, the Paramecium, the oyster, and other simple
organisms, are instinctive reactions to objective stimuli,
the organisms, however, being so shaoed by the experience
that a re-experience of the stimuli more quickly brings
appropriate motor response.
We do not, however, carry our study very far before we
notice a factor distinct in operation from the blind heredita:
mechanism above noted, and the factor expresses itself in
original actions which secure suitable results. Thus in
the Crustacea, among fishes and hymenoptera the dawn of an
intelligence is seen, an intelligence which modifies the
blind instinct for the good of the organism. The organic
memory of the amoeba, Paramecium and lower metazoa gives
way to the associative memory. Just how low in the scale
of animal life the associative memory functions is very doubt
ful, and in regard to this question authorities in the field
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of animal psychology have differed. Some have seen the force
of an associateive memory in the fish rising to top of a tank
on the approach of the feeder, and in the chick wiping its
bill without tasting the cinnabar larvae; while others see in
these actions the simple reaction of the organic memory. One
fact is sure, however, and that is, that the associative
memory finds a place in the life of the higher animals, and
in itself is a mark of evolutionary progress.
vVhile memory of some type and in some degree is basic
to the life of all organisms, it is easily seen that in
different species memory accomplishments differ, and this
difference shows the trend of mind development. Among the
higher animals, lower than man, the range of memory ability
is very broad, and we find in addition to this memory such a
degree of intelligence as enables the organism to overcome
environmental obstacles that otherwise would be impossible to
surmount. The instinctive reaction to a particular stimulus
is so modified that the organism is better served in the
struggle for life. So clear cut are some of these modifications,
and the modifications are made possible by actions, so far re-
moved from the instinctive, and which yet serve in obtain-
ing a desired end, that "purposiveness" is predicated in the
mental life of these animals. Purposiveness undoubtedly
underlies the actions of the chimpanzee Consul as he bites
a stick and fashions it to fit as a key; in the mind of the
dog Jack as he waits to be lifted by his mountain- climbing
master; in the mind of the monkey that works with a stick to
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reqch a larger stick with which to hook the box containing
the banana. An associative memory, aided by an intelligence
that makes purposive action possible, marks this higher phase
of evolutionary progress.
The great disadvantage in the life of these higher animals
however is the lack of a language or other such ability for
the transference of knowledge. One might even say that all
animals below man lack both the power to think and to speak.
Lany inhibitions, however, are taught the developing young
through example, by coaxing, by punishment; but these to-
gether are lacking in degree to what might be taught if
language were to these animals usable.
Along with the development of the mind in organic life
there is noted a physiological development, and the curve
is so marked in the one field as in the other, as to give
support to the hypothesis that the physiological and the
psychical developments in organic life are complementary.
As was noted in the body of the thesis, this statement must
be accepted as applying not to a particular step between
members of a like species but to the broad sweep of evolution
as a whole. Thus the illustrations given by BIcDougall , abd
the differences noted in the scope of life of the organisms
mentioned, show a physiological along with the psychical
development
•
In the study of Memory and Imagination as formed in
organic life, particularly in their application to human life,
several developments are seen, each in turn marking evolutionary
1 Outline of Psychology.
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advance. It is seen that in man as in the lower animals
the organic memory, the pensori-motor memory, plays its
part, and to a considerable degree, simplifies human life.
But in some of the higher animals as in man we see evidences
of the associative memory in which the Image functions. In
these higher animals including man, the Image is used in re-
membering the satisfiers and annoyers of life, and life as
a whole is benefited thereby. The Image may not be used
invariably but it is an added factor, used at 'will, which
adds considerabl;/- to the memory ability.
The beginnings of the imaginative life, that is the life
in which there is a distinct play of memory images, is very
problematical. There is, however, much evidence pointing
to the fact that many of the higher animals belo\Y man ex-
perience such sensations, even though they may be somewhat
vague. In the life of man the influe^le of imagery in Flights
of Fancy is very great. As has been shown, both child and
adult dream dreams, that while intangible, are nevertheless
real and far-reaching in their influence, and in these Imagina
tions many of the pleasures of life are found.
An evolutionary advance upon these Flights of Fancy is
seen in the creative imagination at work in the Forward Look.
Through this added faculty the possessor is able to utilize
memory advantages in planning out the future life. Memory
of past experiences, through the use of the imagination,
is used in distinguishing between satisfiers and annoyers,
and energy is focused upon the satisfiers to such a degree
that the mind becomes creative in function. The physiological
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is more and more relegated to a secondary Influence by the
psychical until the latter is given first place in the life
of the organism.
In conceptual thought and language, as they become the
possession of the human race, we find a factor, or factors,
not only denoting evolutionary progress but giving to the
possessor the power to learn, as an individual and as a
member of a social group, as has heretofore been possessed
by no organism. Through the advantages of conceptual thought,
that is, an understanding of principles as distinct from
objects, the human race has become a learning, an inventive,
a progressive people. Through the power of coneptual thought
scientific and inventive progress has been made possible,
while through the development of the Ideal, this too de-
pending on the power of conceptual thought, man has more
and more separated himself from his physiological being.
So in the life of the Brahman ascetic the physiological
is counted almost as nothing.
The place of Language in the evolutionary scheme has
also been considered and the conclusion is drawn that only
among the members of the human race do we find this factor
functioning. While the claim has often been made that
q.nimals low in the scale of organic life converse by some
form of language ability, the Thesis holds to the view that
all cries, calls, and sounds, made by organisms other than
man, while perhaps being purposive in function, are neverthe-
less motor responses to objective stimuli and not the expression
(0
of conceptual thought as in the case of Talking among men.
Even the "words" of the "talking" birds are held to be not
words as expressing ideas but sounds expressing a physiological
condition, and are uttered largely on the sensori-motor level.
It is seen, then, that the Thesis maintains the view that
conceptual thought and language, the two working as one -whole,
make possible the Idea and the Ideal, along with such motor
expression as to make the Idea and Ideal understood by others.
Through the power possessed by man in conceptual thought and
language he has attained to the highest point in the evolutionary
development, and has brought the material world into sub-
jection to his whims as has no other organism.
It is thus held in the development of the Thesis that
a distinct trend of mind-development is seen in the evolving
memory and imaginative ability, and in the development of
conceptual thought expressed In language, using in the
latter the advantages of the former, to the highest degree.
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